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This chapter takes up the adage that “concepts are going downhill all the time” to explore 
whether and how this harsh but possibly fair judgement applies to the concepts, and 
methods, of actor-network theory (ANT). My charting of the undoing of ANT is 
undertaken purposefully, with the express aim of identifying tasks for a redoing of ANT. 
The first half of the chapter discusses the quintessential ANT idea that there can be “no 
re-composition without de-composition.” I argue that this conceptual coupling elaborates 
the American pragmatist concept of “the problematic situation.” But ANT added two 
decisive elements: (a) Problematic situations can generate new entities (variable 
ontology); (b) the problematic situation is a force of “heterogenization”:  Its constituent 
entities  are marked by boundary-crossings. I then consider how both these propositions 
proved too much, for ANT, for social theory more widely, and, in a manner of speaking, 
for the world. The second half discusses three specific undoings of ANT, each of which 
has to do with the resurfacing, both empirically – in the world – and methodologically – 
as problems for research –  of categories that ANT claimed to have put to rest – which I 
rather grandiosely sum up as: (1) Interpretation is back. (2) Society is back. (3) 
Epistemology is back. If we are to move on from these redoings of modern critical theory’s 
guiding concepts, I propose that we should focus on ANT’s experimentalism – its 
affirmation that knowing the world and changing the world are intimately connected – and 
that it has this in common with other experimentalisms, in sociology, the sciences, social 
movements, tech culture and the arts. 
 
 
Introduction	
Actor-network	theory	(ANT)	has	been	a	giver	of	many	gifts.	It	has	produced	new	analytic	vocabulary,	
research	protocols,	many	memorable	slogans	and	dictums,	and	a	distinctive	intellectual	style.	It	has	
identified	future	directions	of	travel	for	thought.	It	has	shown	philosophers	and	ethnographers	alike	that	
there	is	a	way	of	being	in	a	field	while	not	being	of	the	field	(Kelly,	2012).	ANT	has	taken	the	famous	
British	talent	for	self-depreciation	a	step	further,	by	turning	it	into	an	embodied	research	practice,	as	in	
the	case	of	the	celebrated	sociologist	of	technology	describing	his	meeting	with	a	company	director	in	a	
deserted	reception	area	while	slouching	uncomfortably	in	a	chair	that	was	too	low	(Law,	1994).	However,	
as	the	German	social	and	media	theorist	Erhard	Schuttpelz	put	it	rather	brutally,	‘all	concepts	are	going	
downhill	all	the	time.’	I’m	afraid	that	this	extends	to	methods,	and	that	the	concepts	and	methods	of	ANT	
are	no	exception,	and	in	these	notes,	I	would	like	to	sketch	out	briefly	why	I	think	ANT	is	not	escaping	this	
harsh	but	possibly	fair	fate,	and	what	we	might	do	about	the	inevitably	challenging	repercussions.	
However,	it	is	also	appropriate	to	note	here	that,	in	a	variation	on	ANT’s	many	slogans,	there	can	be	‘no	
re-composition	without	de-composition!’	My	charting	of	the	undoing	of	ANT	in	this	chapter	is	undertaken	
purposefully,	with	the	express	aim	of	identifying	tasks	for	a	redoing	of	ANT,	which	I	will	list	in	the	
conclusion.	 
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Un-	and	redoing	in	ANT	and	Pragmatism	 
Indeed,	one	of	the	most	generative,	and	possibly	enduring,	set	of	terms	offered	by	ANT	is	that	of	
‘composition’	and	‘re-composition.’	The	idea,	briefly	put,	is	that	something	must	get	undone	in	order	for	it	
to	be	done.	This	does	not	only	extend	to	the	associative	coupling	which	today	can	surely	be	called	Latour	
(2005)	speak	–	to	assemble	is	to	reassemble	–	but	also	to	specific	modalities	of	enquiry	–	or	knowledge	
practice:	To	research	is	to	re-search	(Rogers,	2013),	and	to	invent	is	to	reinvent	(Lury	and	Wakeford,	
2012).	Crucially,	further-	more,	the	undoing	of	things	in	order	for	them	to	be	redone,	ANT	style,	does	not	
only	happen	in	spectacular	moments,	in	periods	of	the	so-called	great	transformations;	composition	and	
recomposition	is	the	way	of	many	practices,	institutions	and	formations	most	of	the	time.	The	double	
movement	of	un-	and	redoing	then	does	not	only	signal	that	an	epoch-defining	rupture	may	be	unfolding	
but	can	equally	indicate	that	a	mundane	process	is	underway.	 
This	latter	insight	is	central	to	the	intellectual	challenge	that	ANT	poses	to	reifications	and	naturalisations	
of	all	sorts,	to	engrained	habits	of	thought	and	action	across	the	domains	of	science,	politics,	religion,	
economy	and	society,	where	it	is	still	the	default	to	presume	the	autonomous	existence	of	entities	(reality,	
the	people,	god,	society,	etc.),	and	that	their	legitimacy	–	their	right	to	endure	–	is	predicated	on	a	
pregiven	autonomous	existence.	(This,	in	turn,	has	the	consequence	that	many	institutions	today	continue	
to	be	heavily	invested	in	bracketing	or	even	denying	the	ways	in	which	the	aforementioned	entities	are	
marked	or	even	informed	by	practices,	technologies	or	environments.)	For	ANT,	by	contrast,	the	
autonomy	of	any	entity	is	best	treated	as	an	accomplishment,	one	likely	to	depend	on	sup-	porting	
arrangements	and	support	acts,	which	are	not	just	‘social‘	but	include	environmental	entities	previously	
categorised	as	nature,	and	which,	when	they	cease	to	be	operative,	herald	the	undoing	of	the	autonomy	of	
said	entity,	and	possibly	of	said	entity	itself,	which	will	then	require	a	redoing	of	some	sort.1	 
In	insisting	in	this	way	on	de-	and	recomposition	as	a	formative	process	that	occurs	across	domains,	ANT	
places	itself	in	direct	continuity	with	Pragmatism,	the	American	philosoph-	ical	and	sociological	
tradition2:	Like	ANT,	early	20th-century	philosophers	like	Charles	Peirce,	William	James	and	John	Dewey	
had	as	one	of	their	principal	objectives	to	challenge	naturalism	and	reification,	and	it	was	to	this	end	that	
they	developed	a	relational	ontology	–	briefly	put,	the	proposition	that	processes	of	association	are	
critical	to	existence	and	the	coming	into	existence	of	things.	Like	ANT,	moreover,	John	Dewey	(1938)	
identified	‘prob-	lematisation’	as	a	defining	operator	of	these	processes,	not	only	in	knowledge,	but	also	in	
politics,	morality	and	art.	The	undoing	of	entities	–	the	loosening	of	associations	–	in	order	for	them	to	be	
redone	–	for	different	associations	to	enter	into	the	making	of	said	entities	–	is	not	a	mechanical	process,	
but	a	profoundly	risky	one,	one	that	puts	entities	and	their	relations	at	stake.	As	John	Dewey	(1908)	put	it,	
in	the	problematic	situation,	a	‘conflict	of	tendencies’	makes	itself	felt,	one	that	can	only	be	resolved	by	
‘changing	conditions.’	To	which	ANT	added:	...and	by	bringing	different	entities,	and	the	possibility	of	
their	existence,	into	the	mix.	For	both	Pragmatism	and	ANT,	problematisation	is	not	some	clean,	authored	
process,	in	which	to	define	or	frame	a	problem	is	always	already	to	render	it	solvable,	but	an	unsettling	
occasion,	on	which	the	appearance	on	the	scene	of	an	entity	that	was	previously	disregarded	unsettles	the	
existing	roles,	relations,	environments	and	capacities	of	agents	and/or	categories	(they	are	not	acting,	not	
‘in	control,’	not	having	it	covered),	and	necessitates	their	requalifica-	tion.	While	most	of	this	was	already	
contained	in	Dewey’s	concept	of	the	problematic	situa-	tion,	ANT	added	the	multiplication	of	entities	as	a	
key	dimension	of	this	process.	In	studies	of	technoscience,	the	invention	of	biological,	military	and	moral	
entities	–	the	vaccine,	the	bomb	and	the	pregnancy	test	–	problematisation	was	shown	to	operate	not	only	
on	roles,	relations,	environments	and	capacities	of	actors,	but	to	enable	the	coming	into	being	of	new	
entities.	 
Even	if	I	got	to	know	ANT	before	I	started	reading	American	Pragmatism,	the	former	for	me	is	in	many	
ways	a	redoing	of	the	latter,	with	some	important	twists.	Much	can	be	said	at	this	point,	but	what	makes	
ANT	most	decisively	different	from	Pragmatism,	in	my	view,	above	and	beyond	its	aforementioned	
commitment	to	variable	ontology	–	the	possibility	of	new	entities	coming	into	existence	–	is	its	
commitment	to	heterogeneity,	to	heterogeneous	composition,	and	the	heterogenisation	of	domains.	This	
can	be	loosely	summed	up	as	the	insight	that	most	things	that	matter	arise	out	of	association	of	entities	
deriving	from	diverse	domains	–	science	and	politics,	medicine	and	religion,	engineering	and	culture,	the	
home	and	the	street.	Some	of	ANT’s	most	well-known	slogans	point	in	this	direction:	Science	is	politics	by	
other	means	(Latour,	1993);	engineering	is	sociology	by	other	means	(Latour,	1996).	In	ANT,	it	becomes	
clear	that	an	associationist	ontology,	one	which	posits	ongoing	de-	and	recomposition,	if	consistently	
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pursued,	does	not	only	unsettle	institutional	investments	in	naturalism	and	reification	within	different	
domains,	but	equally	challenges	institutional	boundaries	between	domains,	such	as	between	science	and	
politics,	society	and	technology.	If	we	pursue	processes	of	association,	including	dis-	and	reassoci-	ation,	
we	end	up,	not	only	with	recognition	of	the	hybrid	character	of	much	that	exists	in	this	world,	but	also	
with	an	insight	into	the	ongoing	reality	and	generative	capacities	of	boundary-crossings.	 
To	be	sure,	the	notion	that	adopting	an	associationist	ontology	means	pursuing	or	even	affirming	
boundary-crossing	is	not	unfamiliar	to	Pragmatism:	Dewey	(1991/1927)	famously	wrote	that	industry	
gives	rise	to	new	types	of	associations	‘which	break	existing	forms.’	Still,	for	Pragmatists	like	Dewey,	
situations	are	ultimately	containable	within	bounded	conditions,	as	problem-solving	follows	
problematisation	as	surely	as	night	follows	day.	The	moment	in	which	the	endurance	of	things	and	
relations	are	put	at	stake	–	the	moment	of	problematisation	–	in	Pragmatism	is	a	passing	moment,	and	
one,	moreover,	that	can	be	as-	signed	a	designated	place	in	a	cycle	of	enquiry:	It	is	at	the	beginning,	as	the	
problematicness	of	a	problematic	situation	first	becomes	apparent,	that	‘a	conflict	of	tendencies’	makes	
itself	felt,	or	‘something	seems	to	be	missing’	(Dewey,	1908).	In	the	Deweyian	schema	presented	in	the	
Logic	of	Enquiry,	however,	at	the	end	of	the	cycle	of	enquiry	–	or	mobilisation,	or	creation	–	humpty	
dumpty	will	have	been	put	back	together	again.3	Which	is	to	say,	Dewey’s	problematic	situation	had	
inscribed	into	it	the	expectation	that	decomposition	will	and	should	be	followed	by	recomposition.	ANT’s	
notion	of	hybridisation	points	towards	a	dynamic	that	is	more	complex,	one	where	entanglement	renders	
the	imposition	of	boundar-	ies	ever	more	challenging,	and	the	ambivalence	of	some	of	ANT’s	proponents	
about	precisely	this	notion	of	hybridisation	suggests	that	they	do	not	have	Dewey’s	confidence	on	this	
point.	 
Even	if	ANT	introduced	the	proposition	of	hybrid	networks,	and	later,	heterogeneous	assemblages,	much	
work	conducted	under	this	banner	is	very	much	like	Pragmatism	in	its	commitment	to	contain	the	
moment	of	problematisation.	ANT	adopted	from	Dewey	the	idea	of	enquiry	as	cycle,	and	ANT,	too,	boxed	
in	problematisation	in	a	‘first	phase’	–	the	moment	of	the	opening	up	of	an	existing	proposition,	say	the	
combustion	engine	(Callon,	1980)	–	to	be	superseded	by	a	‘next	phase’	of	translation	and	then	
stabilisation	of	the	new	network.	It’s	one	reason	why	Latour’s	‘We’ve	never	been	modern’	remains	an	
important	book.	Here,	problematisation	is	shown	to	exceed	efforts	to	contain	it,	not	just	on	the	institu-	
tional	level	–	which	Dewey	recognised	with	his	point	noted	earlier	about	the	need	to	break	existing	forms	
–	but	also	on	the	ontological	level:	In	Latour’s	account,	problematisation	is	the	operator	of	a	process	of	
entanglement,	as	connections	between	distributed	entities	turn	out	to	proliferate	from	the	moment	of	
problematisation	onwards	(‘the	climate	is	changing’;	or	in	a	contemporary	example,	‘AI	is	changing	how	
institutions	think’),	gaining	the	capacity	to	disrupt	established	categories	(there	is	nature,	here	is	society;	
here	is	technology;	there	is	de-	mocracy	and	the	rule	of	law,	etc.).	Hybrids	prove	ever	harder	to	contain.	
The	recomposition	or	renewal	of	categories	will	leave	these	very	categories	transformed,	as	they	are	
undeniably	and	indelibly	marked	by	the	boundary-crossings	of	their	constituent	entities.	 
However,	it	seems	to	me	that	here	we	reach	a	fork	in	the	road	and	a	path	not	taken,	at	least	by	ANT.	Most	
of	its	proponents	are	not	that	interested	in	pursuing	notions	of	boundary-crossing,	the	unsettling	of	
presumptions	of	agency	or	the	renewal	of	categories	as	entailing	their	transformation.	Some	of	the	most	
well-known	inheritors	of	ANT,	today,	are	located	in	the	social	studies	of	markets,	digital	media	studies	
and	in	urban	and	architectural	research,	and	in	each	of	these	cases,	ANT	is	arguably	deployed	in	order	to	
elucidate	a	bounded	domain.	More	precisely,	this	inheritance	of	ANT	–	that	its	successful	uptake	takes	the	
form	of	the	renewal	of	sub-disciplines	–	suggests	that	domains	and	methodologies	must	be	clearly	
bounded	in	order	for	them	to	receive	the	ANT	treatment).	The	further	elaboration	of	ANT	as	a	
methodology	of	heterogeneous	mapping,	and	as	an	agenda	of	heterogenisation,	seems	des-	tined	to	be	
undertaken	from	a	located,	and	to	an	extended	‘domain	specific’	vantage	point.4	As	the	authors	of	the	
1999s	volume	on	the	aftermath	of	ANT	were	clearly	aware,	ANT,	as	a	more	general	approach	or	‘logic	of	
enquiry,’	is	unlikely	to	escape	the	logic	of	de-	and	recom-	position.	Without	further	ado,	I	therefore	would	
like	to	briefly	discuss	how	I	think	ANT	is	being	undone	today	and	how	it	could,	perhaps,	be	redone.	In	
doing	so,	I	will	also	touch	on	the	few	points	of	similarity	and	difference	between	ANT	and	Pragmatism	
noted	earlier.	For	the	sake	of	convenience,	I	will	concentrate	on	three	specific	undoings	of	ANT	as	a	
general	approach,	each	of	which	has	to	do	with	the	resurfacing	of	categories,	both	empirically	–	in	the	
world	–	and	methodologically	–	as	problems	for	research	–	that	ANT	claimed	to	have	put	to	rest:	(1)	
Interpretation	is	back.	(2)	Society	is	back.	(3)	Epistemology	is	back.	 
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ANT’s	undoings:	interpretation,	society	and	epistemology	 
One	of	the	legacies	of	ANT	is	its	appetite	for	neologism,	its	commitment	to	replace	familiar	terms	from	the	
sociological	and	philosophical	lexicon	with	new	ones:	Collective	for	society,	trace	for	data,	and	actant	for	
actor	and	object.	These	attempts	at	substitution	entailed	the	ban-	ishment	of	certain	key	categories,	
including	the	three	listed	in	this	section	title.	I	would	like	to	propose	here	that	these	terms	are	ready	to	be	
reactivated,	or	have	already	been	reactivated.	This	clearly	puts	me	at	risk	of	making	a	megalomaniac	
argument.5	If	I	think	this	is	worth	it,	it	is	because	I	am	strongly,	and	increasingly	stubbornly,	convinced	
that	some	core	assumptions	of	ANT	–	not	least	the	notion	that	it	is	possible	for	researchers	to	‘follow	
traces,’	and	that	this	does	not	involve	or	require	buying	into	any	given	‘theory,’	at	least	not	initially	–	have	
lost	some	of	their	efficacy,	and	even,	are	ceasing	to	be	tenable.	And,	more	importantly,	that	facing	this	
challenge	–	that	our	propositions	are	going	downhill,	to	speak	with	Schuttpelz,	today	possibly	even	more	
so	than	yesterday	–	is	critical	if	we,	or	others,	are	to	get	some-	where	with	the	task	of	redoing	ANT	in	the	
face	of	its	undoings.	The	challenge	or	danger	is	as	follows:	Each	of	the	three	key	words	identified	in	my	
short	but	heavy	list	earlier	has	been	shown,	by	ANT	and	Pragmatism,	to	lead	away	from	associationist	
ontology	into	a	split	world	(dualisms!),	where	it	is	all	too	easy	to	succumb	to	reification.	Keeping	this	
danger	in	the	front	of	our	minds	should	then	also	help	us	to	keep	what	is	to	be	gained	from	the	redoing	of	
ANT	firmly	on	the	horizon.	 
Interpretation	is	back	 
Earlier,	I	defined	ANT	as	an	associationist	ontology,	but	the	approach	is	probably	best	known	for	its	
proposal	to	extend	agency	to	non-humans,	and	its	commitment	to	include	objects,	in-	frastructures	and	
environments	as	active	elements	in	social	life.	One	important	consequence	of	this,	and	one	with	which	
many	anthropologists	and	some	sociologists	have	taken	issue,	was	the	bracketing,	in	ANT,	of	the	role	of	
interpretation	in	social	life,	as	well	as	in	social	research.	ANT	qualifies	humans	and	non-humans	as	
actants:	They	leave	their	trace	in	the	world	not	through	expression	(‘what	they	say’),	but	by	way	of	their	
actions	(‘what	they	do’).	And	the	role	of	ANT	itself	was	not	to	offer	interpretation,	but	to	assemble	traces	
into	descriptions	or	accounts.	However,	one	of	the	defining	issues	in	the	area	of	science,	technology	and	
society,	today,	precisely	concerns	interpretation,	or	more	precisely,	the	reworking	of	the	boundary	 
between	interpretation	and	action.	As	computation	has	emerged	as	a	defining	element	in	technological	
and	scientific	infrastructures,	issues	of	intelligibility	are	once	again	in	the	fore-	ground.	Contemporary	
debates	about	bias	are	a	case	in	point.	In	recent	years,	algorithms	have	been	exposed	as	discriminatory,	as	
they	amplify	the	racist	and	sexist	assumptions	latent	in	the	data	from	which	they	learn	to	detect	patterns,	
such	as	databases	recording	police	arrests	(Eubanks,	2018),	while	in	science	the	allegation	of	bias	is	
treated	by	some	as	a	‘cheap’	trick	deployed	by	subalterns	who	are	trying	to	get	in	by	policitising	science,	
and	in	so	doing	debase	the	value	of	knowledge.6	 
In	some	respects,	today’s	debates	about	bias	seem	highly	susceptible	to	ANT	treatment:	‘bias’	tends	to	be	
defined	as	an	attribute	of	an	actor	(be	it	human	or	non-human),	or	an	effect	of	an	analytic	operation,	and	
both	these	conceptions	of	bias	are	highly	reductive,	as	they	tempt	us	to	disregard	the	process	by	which	
bias	emerges	from	relations	between	machines	and	humans,	and	many	other	legal,	environmental,	moral	
entities,	besides.	However,	at	the	same	time,	an	understanding	of	these	relations	in	terms	of	‘actants,’	as	
ANT	would	propose,	does	not	enable	us	to	grasp	the	problematic	denoted	as	‘bias’	either:	It	is	rather	the	
labelling	of	actors	that	is	at	issue	here	(Becker,	1963;	Hacking,	1986).	The	deliberately	thin	categories	of	
actant	and	trace	are	too	ephemeral	if	the	aim	is	to	express	the	normative	effect	that	comes	with	the	
negation	of	difference/the	other.7	To	get	at	the	latter,	we	need	to	follow	through	the	production	of	bias	as	
an	interpretative	process.	 
In	the	wake	of	controversies	about	bias,	a	seemingly	ANT-like	challenge	surfaces:	Do	we	blame	society,	or	
science	and	technology	for	these	discriminatory	effects?	Surely,	these	con-	troversies	provide	
opportunities	to	point	out	that	it	must	be	both,	that	associations	between	humans	and	machines	produce	
at	least	some	of	these	discriminatory	effects?	ANT	certainly	has	something	important	to	contribute	to	
these	debates	insofar	as	it	compels	us	to	widen	the	range	of	possible	answers	beyond	the	binary,	to	say	
either	both	or	neither.	It	can	show	us	the	limits	of	an	understanding	of	the	politics	of	technology	that	
treats	bias	as	either	subjective	attribute	or	an	objective	effect.	The	problem	is	that	the	ANT	manoeuvre	of	
letting	the	hy-	brid	emerge	–	it’s	both!	–	does	not	appear	sufficient	to	account	for	this	type	of	problematic	
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situation:	It	is	not	only	on	the	level	of	association	between	humans	and	non-humans,	but	from	a	dynamic	of	
interaction	between	entities	and	categories	that	problematic	effects	arise	here.	To	say	that	bias	emerges	
from	hybrid	networks	doesn’t	articulate	the	problem.	Pointing	to	network	formation	between	entities,	or	
even,	the	situated	enactment	of	entities,	does	not	quite	get	us	there.	It	does	not	really	allow	us	to	specify	
the	process	by	which	actors	qualify	their	relations	to	others	through	the	application	of	categories.	To	
uncover	that	kind	of	operation	on	alterity	–	and	by	extension	diversity	–	as	something	that	is	negated	or	
affirmed,	amplified	or	disavowed,	we	need	to	recover	the	qualities	of	interpretative	process,	the	process	
by	which	a	category	gains	a	hold	on	an	entity.	This	relative	blind	spot	of	ANT	for	interpretative	effects	has	
long	been	highlighted	in	feminist	science	studies	(Leigh	Star,	1990)	but	today’s	digital	forms	of	circula-	
tion	enable	significantly	more	interactive	and	amplificatory	interpretative	circuits,	requiring	renewed	
engagement	with	this	process	and	their	effects.	 
The	social	is	back	 
This	brings	us	to	the	vexed	but	unescapable	issue	of	the	social.	ANT	is	closely	associated	with	what	others	
with	a	taste	for	ceremonial	declarations	called	the	‘Death	of	the	Social’	(Rose,	Baudrillard)	and	for	which	
more	constructively	and/or	creatively	minded	scholars	minted	other	terms:	the	post-social	(Knorr-
Cetina),	the	more-than-human	(Braun	and	Whatmore).	In	Latour’s	provocative	appropriation	of	Tatcher,	
‘there	is	no	such	thing	like	society.” However,	at	least	from	where	I	am	writing	in	the	UK,	the	social	seems	
to	be	very	much	back	on	the	agenda.	As	Will	Davies	(2015)	noted,	the	last	years	have	seen	a	proliferation	
of	new	‘socials,’	as	the	label	social	is	being	slapped	onto	a	variety	of	technical	or	commercial	sounding	
propositions,	from	social	media,	to	social	innovation,	social	technology,	social	market-	ing,	social	bonds,	
social	enterprise,	social	design,	social	listening	and	so	on.	To	be	sure,	many	of	these	new	socials	prove	to	
be	all	too	thin	labels	covering	over	a	proposition	that	has	much	more	to	do	with	technology	than	with	
society:	To	add	‘social’	in	practice	often	means	to	dis-	place	services	away	from	public	institutions	and	
into	alternative	and	–	oh	irony	–	hybrid	ar-	chitectures,	realised	with	the	aid	of	a	mix	of	public	and	private	
funding,	and	more	often	than	not	involving	digital	platforms	(for	a	more	detailed	discussion,	see	Marres	
and	Gerlitz,	2018).	In	other	words,	the	social	in	this	vocabulary	becomes	an	near-synonym	of	the	
displacement	of	the	facilitation	of	‘togetherness‘	from	a	public	responsibility	to	a	profit-making	activity,	
and	as	such	pretty	much	means	the	opposite	of	what	social	policy,	social	housing,	etc.,	used	to	mean	in	the	
1960s.	However,	if	we	probe	deeper,	it	becomes	clear	that	‘sociality’	is	not	only	a	public-facing	label	but	
equally	denotes	a	methodology.	As	Kieron	Healy,	Bernard	Rieder	and	Wendy	Chun	have	forcefully	
reminded	us,	sociological	methodology	–	from	Simmel’s	triadic	closure	and	Merton’s	homofily	–	has	
crucially	informed	the	methods	materialised	in	the	‘new’	social	innovation	paradigm	(for	a	discussion,	see	
Marres,	2017).	 
What	does	this	mean	for	ANT?	At	the	very	least,	it	means	that	rejection	of	the	very	term	(‘social’)	has	
become	unviable	as	an	empirical	strategy:	The	rise	to	prominence	of	social	tech-	nologies	clearly	falls	
within	the	domain	of	study	that	ANT	was	designed,	lest	we	forget,	to	elucidate:	Science,	technology	and	
innovation.	However,	arguably	more	challenging	is	that	the	proposition	of	social	technology	–	whether	or	
not	we	find	it	credible	or	acceptable	–	is	threatening	to	undo	some	of	the	propositions	of	early	ANT,	not	
least	the	notion	of	the	‘lab-	oratization	of	society.’	In	early	work	by	Latour,	Callon	and	Law,	the	extension	
of	scientific	infrastructures	beyond	the	laboratory	was	assumed	to	make	society	more	like	science.	How-	
ever,	when	we	consider	how	distinctively	social	methodologies	are	being	operationalised	in	technological	
and	analytical	architectures	across	society	today,	it	becomes	clear	that	the	opposite	effects	may	equally	
arise.	As	platforms	operate	on	the	basis	of	liking	and	friending,	social	life	becomes	more	like	‘society‘	as	
imagined	by	sociologists:	Preoccupied	with	reputa-	tion,	pursuing	the	accumulation	of	social	capital.	
Laboratisation	does	not	make	social	life	re-	semble	a	laboratory,	but	is	resulting	in	the	reformatting	of	
activities	in	social	sciences’	image	(reputation	as	currency,	anyone?).	However,	at	the	point	where	we	can	
see	how	the	laborat-	isation	thesis	is	being	unsettled	today,	we	can	learn	something	important	from	
Pragmatism:	One	of	the	lasting	contributions	of	John	Dewey	has	been	to	insist	that	experimentalism	does	
not	just	denote	a	scientific	paradigm,	that	it	does	not	just	belong	to	the	sciences	(Marres,	and	Stark,	
forthcoming).	It	is	equally	an	approach	in	politics,	morality	and	aesthetics.	As	the	British	novelist	Joanna	
Kavenna	puts	it:	‘If	you’re	uncertain	you	will	test	all	the	parameters.	If	you’re	certain	you	will	protect	the	
citadel.	The	former	is	where	things	can	shift	because	you	have	tested	all	the	possibilities.’8	The	
proliferation	of	experimental	propositions	across	society	and	culture	indicates	not	simply	that	the	realm	
of	science	is	being	extended.	They	may	equally	denote	the	growing	resonance	of	experimental	traditions	
from	literature,	the	arts	and	politics.	 
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Epistemology	is	back	 
ANT	has	been	closely	associated	with	the	ontological	turn,	the	move	–	very	briefly	put	–	of	locating	
entities	and	processes	first	on	the	plane	of	existence,	and	only	then	on	the	plane	of	knowledge.	But	clever	
readers	and	authors	of	ANT	were	quick	to	point	out	that	it’s	not	that	straightforward.	ANT	is	not	
existentialism.	When	you	try	doing	so	in	relation	to	an	actual	example,	it	turns	out	to	be	really	hard	to	
separate	knowing	from	existing,	and	that,	indeed,	became	ANT’s	point	(as	indeed,	it	was	Pragmatism’s	
before	that).	Never-	theless,	ANT	joined	fellow	travellers	like	the	philosopher	Richard	Rorty	in	embracing	
a	deflationary	approach	to	theories	of	knowledge	(Lynch,	2013).	Actor-network	theorists	have	been	very	
unforgiving	about	epistemology;	it	was	and	long	remained	one	of	their	primary	targets,	coming	right	after	
Durkheimian	sociology,	and	for	a	younger	generation	of	actor-network	theorists	seemed	mostly	
irrelevant,	as	other	settings,	from	parliament	to	architecture	studios,	took	the	place	of	research	and	
development	laboratories	as	favoured	research	sites.	Early	ANT	had	sought	to	undo	epistemology	by	
dissolving	its	foundational	problems,	according	to	the	following	recipe:	(a)	Identify	a	general	problem	of	
epistemology	(how	do	we	access	reality?);	(b)	empiricise	it	–	in	other	words,	turn	it	into	a	research-eable	
problem	–	by	translating	it	into	a	phenomenon	that	could	be	observed	ethnographically,	in	a	field	site	and	
then,	(c)	make	the	philosophical	problem	disappear	by	respecifying	it	in	practical	terms.	Following	this	
recipe,	in	its	more	adventurous	moments,	ANT	sought	to	dissolve	the	great	foundational	problems	of	
epistemology:	There	is	no	‘gap	between	subject	and	object.’	 
I’m	afraid	this	has	reasons	that	would	require	a	book	of	its	own,	but	today	it	would	be	a	mistake	to	
attempt	to	make	such	foundational	problems	simply	disappear.	How	do	we	know?	How	does	the	public	
know?	Instead,	these	questions	must	be	asked	again	and	again,	and	can’t	be	asked	often	enough.	The	rise	
of	fake	news	and	growing	evidence	of	attempts	at	opinion	manipulation	online	has	put	the	normative	
question	of	the	validity	of	knowledge	claims,	above	and	beyond	the	empirici-sable	question	of	relevance,	
back	on	the	agenda:	Deception	and	duplicity	abound	in	today’s	digital	architectures,	demonstrating	the	
need	for	the	identification	not	just	of	sources	that	are	active,	topical	and	engaged	(the	measurement	of	
relevance	in	which	search	engines	excelled),	but	the	determination	of	validity	conditions	for	knowledge	
claims	(Bounegru,	Marres	and	Gray,	2018).	Campaigns	against	knowledge,	in	particular	public	
knowledge,	have	too	many	allies	today,	and	it	seems	unlikely	that	these	can	be	satisfactorily	dealt	with	by	
a	strategy	of	deflation.	 
But	here,	too,	Pragmatism	can	come	to	the	rescue:	For	intellectuals	like	Dewey,	the	objective	was	never	
deflation.	While	his	principal	target	was	indeed	epistemology,	and	most	of	all,	the	intolerance	of	doubt	
that	epistemology	was	used	to	justify,	his	strategy	was	never	to	abandon	the	valuation	of	knowledge	as	a	
normative	project:	Pragmatisms’	project	was	to	re-construct	the	problems	of	philosophy.	They	used	
methods	of	re-specification,	and	highlighted	the	relational	and	situational	character	of	even	the	most	
seemingly	abstract	phenomena	and	processes,	as	a	way	not	of	collapsing	but	of	requalifying	problems	of	
knowl-	edge,	not	in	order	to	make	epistemology	disappear	(deflate	it),	but	in	order	to	relocate	them	in	
relation	to	life,	and,	thus,	to	transform	our	understanding	of	the	relation	between	the	problems	of	
knowledge	and	the	problems	of	the	world,	and	of	society.	They	insisted	that	the	distance	between	these	
different	types	of	problems	is	often	smaller	than	philosophers	and	sociologists,	and	scholars	and	‘people’	
–	those	committed	to	abstract	knowledge	and	those	committed	to	‘keeping	it	real’	–	like	to	believe.	To	re-
specify	problems	of	epistemology	in	field	settings	does	not	mean	that	empirical	research	can	take	the	
place	of	epistemology.	Rather,	the	pragmatists	were	the	precursors	of	empirical	philosophy	(Mol,	2000).	
Compo-	sition	and	recomposition,	in	Pragmatism,	denote	not	only	a	process	of	recombinant	asso-	ciation	
between	humans	and	non-humans,	but	equally	a	methodology	for	the	valuation	of	abstract	entities,	like	
truth.	  
Conclusion	 
These	notes	are	brief	and	sketchy,	but	the	point	I	am	edging	towards	is	that	of	an	experimental	approach	
to	social	and	cultural	enquiry.9	Both	Pragmatism	and	ANT	sensitised	us	to	new	ways	in	which	
representing	and	intervening	(Hacking,	1983)	are	combined	in	societies	‘marked	by	the	invention	of	
science	and	technology’	to	use	Isabelle	Stengers’s	helpful	phrase.	The	process	of	getting	to	know	the	
world	and	changes	in	existing	conditions	in	the	world	are	intimately	connected,	this	is	what	the	concept	
‘the	problematic	situation‘	tells	us,	and	is	signalled	by	the	twin	notions	of	de-	and	recomposition.	
However,	as	Pragmatism	recognised	much	earlier	on,	experimentality	extends	across	domains,	it	operates	
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not	just	in	the	domain	of	science,	or	innovation,	but	society	too	must	be	invented	(Marres,	Guggenheim	
and	Wilkie,	2018),	and	so	must	democracy,	and	the	arts,	and	culture.	Commitment	to	these	objectives	
does	not	necessarily	mean	that	‘the	world	must	become	more	like	science.’	The	question	rather	is	how	
different	the	recomposed	collective	is,	can	and	is	allowed	to	be	from	its	previous	iteration,	and	what	tests	
can	be	organised	and/or	designed	in	order	to	establish	whether	and	how	this	affirmation	of	diversity	
‘holds,’	and	can	be	made	to	hold,	in	empirical	reality.	Pursuing	this	question	is	likely	to	require	
engagement	with	experimental	traditions	beyond	Pragmatism	or	ANT	and	indeed	beyond	the	university	
narrowly	defined,	bound	up	as	it	must	be	with	the	diversification	of	the	very	collective	we	still	like	to	
label	‘research	community.’	As	Bruno	Latour	brought	out	his	hammer	and	nails	to	set	to	work	on	ANT’s	
coffin	20	years	ago,	it	may	be	tempting	for	the	rest	of	us	to	leave	the	burial	ritual	to	him	and	his	close	
collaborators.	However,	as	time	passes,	I’m	more	and	more	convinced	that	if	we	are	to	get	somewhere	in	
the	redoing	of	ANT,	then	the	job	of	its	undoing	must	be	taken	up	not	just	by	its	inventors,	but	by	many	
more	of	us.	 
Notes	 
1		In	a	conversation	with	Graham	Harman	(Latour,	Harman	and	Erderly,	2011),	keen	to	identify	a	feminist	
aspiration	in	early	ANT,	I	referred	to	this	as	a	‘metaphysics	of	the	crutch.’	 
2		Several	other	contemporary	approaches	in	the	social	sciences	and	humanities	claim	to	be	inspired	by	
Pragmatism,	and	even	use	it	to	name	their	approach,	like	the	French	sociologists	of	the	Epreuve,	Boltanksi	
and	Thevenot.	Another	case	in	point	is	post-Habermasian	Frankfurter	school.	It	is	cer-	tainly	striking	that	
very	different	schools	of	thought	claim	this	common	ancestry,	and	I	do	think	that,	on	this	point	at	least,	ANT	
is	‘different’	insofar	as	it	is	one	of	the	few,	perhaps	the	only	ap-	proach	that	remained	committed	to	the	
ontological	register	in	which	a	pragmatist	like	Dewey	wrote.	I’m	not	sure,	however,	that	there	is	that	much	
to	gain	from	debating	the	differences	between	the	various	versions	of	pragmatist	sociology	claimed	today,	
at	least	not,	if	the	aim	is	to	evaluate	ANT’s	viability	as	a	contemporary	intellectual	programme,	as	is	my	aim	
here.	 
3		This	is	not	to	say	that	Dewey	did	not	acknowledge	the	possibility	of	enduring	failure.	But	his	con-	ception	
of	the	problematic	situation	as	an	occasion	for	enquiry	(knowledge	formation)	in	the	Logic	of	Enquiry	
supposes	problem-solving	as	the	horizon	(in	contrast	to	continuously	and	endlessly	unfolding	
problematisations).	With	thanks	to	the	editors	for	their	comments.	 
4		In	other	work,	I	have	discussed	how	the	concept	of	problem-solving	of	Pragmatism	must	be	replaced	with	
the	concept	of	issue	formation,	a	process	marked	not	only	by	the	formation	of	cross-boundary	associations	
but	the	expression	of	antagonism	–	I	would	now	call	it	diversity	–	throughout	this	process.	This	has	various	
consequences,	including	for	how	we	understand	the	relation	between	empiricism	–	which	problem-solving	
prides	itself	on	–	and	critique	–	which	is	a	necessary	ingre-	dient	of	issue	formation.	However,	on	this	point	
too,	I	think	we	move	away	from	ANT,	insofar	as	ANTers	themselves	tend	to	avoid	either	critique	or	the	
discussion	of	it,	putting	their	substantive	commitments	–	be	it	their	feminism,	ecologism	or	postcolonialism	
–	into	the	foreground	instead.	 
5		Even	worse,	I	have	a	number	of	further	possible	undoings	of	ANT	on	my	list,	with	which	I	will	not	bother	
the	reader	in	further	detail,	but	I	include	it	here:	4.	Border-crossings	can	no	longer	be	contained	in	the	sub-
political	domain	if	they	ever	could.	5.	Engineering	is	not,	in	fact,	sociology	by	other	means.	6.	The	Internet	is	
not	a	hybrid	forum.	7.	The	experimental	paradigms	by	which	we’re	increasingly	governed	today	do	not	
facilitate	hybrid	forums	either.	 
6		The	latest	attempt	to	pull	a	Sokal	on	‘grievance	studies’	is	a	relevant	example	here.	https://en.wiki	
pedia.org/wiki/Grievance_Studies_affair.Seealsowww.wired.com/story/why-men-dont-believe-	the-data-
on-gender-bias-in-science/.	 
7		Some	ANTs	are	very	aware	of	this	problem	and	one	way	they	have	addressed	this	is	by	claiming	not	 
traceability	but	storytelling	as	their	register	of	choice.	However,	if	we,	the	scholars,	define	our	craft	as	
storytelling,	why	can’t	our	actors?	It	seems	to	me	that	this	proposed	solution	threatens	to	undo	the	
ontological	turn,	or	to	render	it	less	consequential	insofar	as	it	threatens	to	replace	empiricist	trace-
following	ANT	with	interpretation,	without	re-negotiating	their	relation.	 
8		Joanna	Kavenna,	HowtheLightGetsIn	2018,	Philosophy	Festival,	Hay-on-Wye,	26	May	2018.	 
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9		Whereas	others	proposed	that	addressing	ANT’s	shortcomings	requires	its	transformation	into	a	(object-
oriented)	metaphysics,	I	propose	that	ANT’s	radical	empiricism–	it’s	insistence	on	on-	going	re-composition	
–	must	be	translated	into	a	experimentalist	methodology	(for	a	discussion,	see	Latour,	Harman,	Erdely,	
2011).	 
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